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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME I OCTOBER, 1925 NUMBER 2
THE "TRUST FUND" THEORY A STUDY IN
PSYCHOLOGY
"The assets of an insolvent corporation are a trust fund
for the benefit of all its creditors and no creditor can secure
a preference over others."'
T HE trust fund doctrine was one of the most interesting judicial
creations of the last half of the nineteenth century.2 It performed
and still performs a very useful function, but it has suffered much from
its unfortunate name. In some jurisdictions the result has been an
undue curtailment of its functions; in others, an undue extension of
them.
The doctrine has apparently come in for its most extensive appli-
cation in our own jurisdiction. Indeed, it is here reaching out for
new fields. It is, therefore, important for us to know the real scope
of the theory and whether it should be given further extension.
To determine these questions we must examine the history of the
doctrine, the environment from which it sprang, the psychological
complex which gave it birth, and the course of its later development.
When we know these facts we can form an intelligent opinion about
whether the doctrine should be curtailed ' or extended.'a
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.
The country was passing from agriculture to commerce and in-
dustry. The rules of common law, crystalized during the agricultural
'Mackintosh, J., Terhune v. Weise, 132 Wash. 208, 231 Pac. 954 (1925).
"Roscoe Pound, 49 A. B. A. JouR., p. 210 (1924)" "And in the newer sub-
jects that have taken form within a century, each generation sees the rise and
fall of doctrines and rules. Lawyers here present have seen the rise and fall
of the trust fund doctrine, of imputed negligence, and of Fry's doctrine of
mutuality of remedy."
"'We feel that the limit of its extension has been reached and to further
widen its scope is to impair the doctrine itself." (Mackintosh, J., for the
majority in Terhune v. Weise, supra, at p. 211.)
-a"There is no necessity for the apparent animadversion upon the trust
fund doctrine in the majority opinion." (Holcomb, J., at p. 218.)
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epoch in England, dealt with the remedies of a single creditor or two
against the debtor. As between creditors, few in number and close
at hand, the sporting theory favored the "diligent." "First come,
first served."
But upon the advent of commercial and industrial ventures, the
creditors became many and scattered.
Execution and attachment were found to be quite inadequate for
this condition of affairs. Creditors out of view and who resided at
a distance suffered. It came to pass that the "law favored the favorite
creditor." This preferring of the favorite creditors became in this
country, as early as 1817, to be "extensively felt and deeply deplored."'
The picture is ably painted by Remington in the introduction to his
treatise on Bankruptcy.6
"It was, then," as Remington' sums it up, "the growth of commerce
and of trading on credit and the consequent springing up of a com-
(a) "Die spielerische entscheidung" of Ehrlich in "DIE JtI5sTISCHE LOGIr,"
p. 295. (b) See Pound, SPRIT OF T13E Coizximro LAw, p. 19 (1921).
Kent, Ch., in 2 Johns Ch. 565, 577, pointing out that had not the rule of
agricultural England been changed "I much doubt whether it would have been
so long endured," in that country, and that the French Code likewise enforced
the doctrine of equality (p. 577).
'I Rim. oN BANKRUPTCY (3d Ed.), p. 20 (1923) The condition of affairs
that existed when there was no bankruptcy law preventing preferences is well
remembered. Those were days when the law of the survival of the fittest had
unrestrained operation. No confidences were possible between a debtor and his
creditors. The debtor who found his affairs getting into bad shape dared not
breathe a word of his condition to any creditor, lest such a one would become
alarmed and come down upon him with the sheriff. Nor did one creditor
dare confer with another about their common debtor's affairs lest the other
creditor take immediate action and get ahead of him.
"There were no mutual confidences possible, for it was the reign of the
old common law, whose fundamental maxim, translated into popular language,
is 'first come, first served. The maxim, 'The law favors the diligent creditor'
too often came to mean 'the law favors the tavorite creditor, the wife or
other relative, or some powerful commercial house or bank which was carrying
a cognovit note or chattel mortgage for ready levy or for the taking of quick
possession.
"The commercial world was given over to the unrestrained rule of the
'survival of the fittest.
"At the hint of coming insolvency began a frantic race for priority.
More than likely the debtor himself would already have given a chattel mort-
gage to some favored creditor or relative and in addition have made an assign-
ment to his own attorney. An attorney specially skilled in such mampulations,
would send Ins clerk to file the mortgage or deed that was the usual incident
to the debtor's failure, with instructions to apprise him the moment the filing
was done, so that immediately thereafter a deed of assignment might be filed.
Whilst all this was going on, creditors, on their part, would be hurrying out
legal papers, one for the appointment of a receiver, another for an execution,
and so forth.
"Those were strenuous times, indeed, when lawyers stayed up all night
preparing papers, and when sheriffs made levies at midnight-oftentimes to
find a receiver or assignee already in charge."
I Id., p. 6.
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munity of interest among all the. creditors of the merchant that made
the old remedies of execution and attachment, designed simply for liti-
gation between a few individuals, insufficient."
This insufficiency could only be met by the doctrine of equality.
To induce great bodies of creditors to contribute to the ventures, the
assurance of equality must be given.
The legislative reaction to this irritation was the bankruptcy laws s
the primary object of which was to secure the equal distribution of
the assets of failed debtors.'
But when the great panic of the early 1890's came to this country
there happened to be no bankruptcy law 10 What were the courts
to do?
The common law of the agricultural era, which merely supervised
the "race of energy" among creditors, offered no relief. Where the
debtor was a corporation, however, the courts were dealing with a
creature of the varying statutes of the states. Should the outworn
principles the courts thought they must apply to individuals, be used
by analogy in the case of corporations? Logic answered, yes; the
mores of the times insisted, no.
Such was the conflict. How did the various courts react towards
this situation, and why?
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Modern psychology has done much to chart the bases upon which
the minds of the judges have proceeded in the various periods. Thus,
at the time in question (early 1890's), the prevailing theory (which
had reached its height, in America, about 1875)11 was that of systemati-
zation, the mechanical application by the courts of preexisting uni-
versals. 12
It was the commonly-accepted viewpoint of the judges themselves,
51542, 34 Henry VIII.
I Ray, J., In re Leslie, 119 Fed. 406, 410 (1903).
0 On account of political conditions; Act of 1800, repealed 1803; Act of
1841, repealed 1843; Act of 1867, repealed 1878.
Roscoe Pound, 36 HAxV. L. REv., p. 659 (1923).
' (a) As Dean Pound has described this "quescent" theory of the judicial
function: "Jurists thought of law as the imperative of the state, applied
mechamcally by tribunals in the administration of justice, or as a body of
traditional legal precepts by which the state permitted causes to be adjudi-
cated for the time being in the absence of its imperatives, or as a body of
formulations of experience of human conduct, and of experience of human
adnumstration of justice, the universal governing principles whereof were
discoverable by historical inquiry. Courts found the grounds of decision in
the rules authoritatively prescribed, or in the traditional legal precepts
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says Prof. Albertsworth,' 3 that they were, when deciding a case, merely
finding or discovering the law, not creating it. This was but the
logical outcome of a blind belief in Montesquieu's philosophy of the
complete separation of judicial, legislative and executive powers.1"
"It was the confident belief of the historico-analytical common-law
lawyer that he could solve any problem whatsoever on the basis of
the seventeenth-century English law referred back to its simplest ideal
form in the Year Books. New forms of doing business, new agencies
of menace to the general security, new forms and purposes of associa-
tion, new conceptions of human relations and new social habits were
quite immaterial." 1 5
Such was the mental handicap of the judges at that time. It sufficed
to dragoon the great majority of the courts into submission to the
agricultural technique on the subject. The creditors' "race of energy"
was thus given the judicial sanction as to corporations.""
However, some of the courts, although rendering lip service to the
prevailing philosophy pertaining to the judicial function, managed to
find their way out. They resorted to a name already familiar in law,17
in which name the desired principle was implicit.' So the property
embodied in judicial decisions of the past, or through logical development of
the historically discovered universals. In either case the judicial function was
one of discovery of the definitely appointed existing precept, or development
of such a precept, already existing potentially in the historically discoverable
universals, by an absolute method admitting of no scope for anything but
logical identification of the actual, or deduction of the potential, legal precept
and mechanical application thereof." (Id., p. 808.)
(b) More graphically described in his IxTERPnETATIOxs oF LEGAL HisToay,
p. 70 (1923), as follows: "In jurisprudence and in politics a descriptive
analytical method prevailed. The details of legal and political institutions
were described in accordance with an analysis drawn from the institutions
themselves, and they were described so faithfully as they stood in detail on a
given day that they had ceased so to stand before the book was off the press."
"VIII A. B. A. Joun., p. 673 (192).
Compare Taft, C. J., in Ex P Grossman, U. S. Adv. Op., Mar. 16, 1925
p. 377, 38.: "Complete independence and separation between the three branches,
however, are not attained, or intended, as other provisions of the Constitution
and the normal operation of government under it easily demonstrated."
"Pound, 36 HiAav. L. REv., p. 817 (1923).
Wyeth Co. v. James Co., 15 Utah 110, 47 Pac. 604 (1897) Ames Co. v.
Ileslet, 19 Mont. 188, 47 Pac. 805 (1897) Farivell Co. v. Sweetzer Co., 10 Col.
App. 421, 41 Pac. 1012 (1897).
Albertsworth, "Imitative Reasoning of the Courts," 8 CoRN-ELL LAw RrV.,
p. 235: "In a large number of instances we observe the courts denominating a
particular thing by a term already known and accepted thereby endeav-
oring to uphold the assumed innovation upon the legal order."
,"A desirable result was reached and the court selected as its standard,
that situation which would secure the desirable result." Radin, XI A. B. A.
Joun., 358 (1925).
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of an insolvent corporation was called a "trust-fund" for the sake of
the equity principle of equality implied in the name.1 9
The process is described in the Vebleman language as follows:
"And it is a trait of human nature that any unavoidable
minimum of change which is perforce infused into the scheme
of conduct will be covered in with an apologetic appeal to
even more ancient and immutable principles erected out of
painstaking subtleties and evasions, such as go to make up the
consistency of the jurists and theologians. The new effectual
factors in the case, those altered material circumstances that
enforce a change in the established scheme of usage and law,
are not allowed to come in openly as being in themselves con-
dusive grounds for the changes of principle which they en-
force. Such is human nature. Any unavoidable move of
this nature must be vouched for by make-believe. Authentic-
ity must be found in underlying principles and immemorial
usage to be discovered by sophistical dialectics." (1923,
ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP p. 17 )
THE JUDICIAL BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION OF THE 1890's.
What was the scope of this "trust-fund" theory? For the sake of
simplicity the decisions of the Washington supreme court will be used
as the exemplification.
Preliminarily, we must exclude some of the variant uses of the term.
The expression, "trust-fund" doctrine, has also been used in connection
with the rights of creditors of a corporation as against its stockholders,
both as to unpaid subscriptions and also as to abstractions from the cor-
porate funds without providing for creditors. It has been demonstrated
by Pomeroy that these cases of creditors against stockholders cannot
be lumped together under any single symbol, such as "trust-fund"
There are, he shows, a number of distinct classes of cases involved, each
properly governed by different principles.
2 0
Many of the cases in the state of Washington are of this type2 1 and
""In order to perform this feat (of reaching a desirable result), judges
have recourse to a great many devices. They relate back. They presume.
They impute. They take judicial notice. They refuse to take judicial notice.
They construe. They charge with knowledge. They impress trusts." Radin,
id., p. 362.
"I For full discussion, see 5 Poy. EQ. (4th), §§2319-2331.
"'McKay v. Elwood, 12° Wash. 579, 41 Pac. 919 (1895), Wilson V. Boo k, 13
Wash. 676, 43 Pac. 939 (1896) Adamant v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac.
415 (1897) Manhattan Co. v. Seattle Coal 'Co., 16 *Wash. 499, 48 Pac. 333
(1897), Tait v. Pigott, 30 Wash. 344, '73 Pac. 364 (1903) Mitchell v. Jordan,
36 Wash. 645, 79 Pac. 311 (1905), Tacoma Ledger Co. v. Western Assn., 37
Wash. 467, 79 Pac. 992 (1905), Carstens r. Hofins, 44 Wash. 456, 87 Pac. 631
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will not be mentioned further. We are concerned only with the giving
of preferences to creditors by insolvent corporations.
The Washington Decisions.
The first thrust towards equality was Thompson v. Huron Lumber
Co., 4 Wash. 600 (1892) 22 That was a case of a blanket mortgage
with no accounting provision. Such an instrument was voidable as a
fraudulent conveyance under "common law" principles, even against
an individual mortgagor..2 3 The court, nevertheless, continued its dis-
cussion, saying that, where the business of the corporation is "practi-
cally stopped" because of unprofitableness, "it ought to be wound up
and its assets distributed. 2 4  At that point the court displays the
"trust-fund" complex as follows:
"But we cannot lose sight of the settled rule concerning
the property of insolvent corporations, viz., that it is a trust
fund for creditors, wherein there is a difference between prop-
erty of a corporation and that of a natural person. Without
enlarging upon a discussion of the subject, we note a remark-
ably clear and forcible case in Rouse v. Merchants National
Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 15 Am. St. Rep. 644, which sustains
the position we take. There is an additional reason, however,
in this state, viz., that our courts are expressly authorized by
statute to appoint receivers of corporations which are insol-
vent or are in imminent danger of insolvency Code Proc.,
§ 326, subd. 5. The purpose in thus placing insolvent cor-
porations in the possession of the courts can only be that their
assets may be distributed ratably to creditors. If
the estate of a corporation comes into the court or into the
hands of the assignee burdened with preferences, there is an
end of equal distribution, and the object of the law is
defeated."
(1906) Dixon v. Ilendy Machne Wks., 51 Wash. 419 99 Pac. 11 (1909)
Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 29-, 116 Pac. 833 (1911) Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Ralston
Co., 71 Wash. 659, 129 Pac. 389 (1913) Jorguson v. Apex Co., 74 Wash. 243, 133
Pac. 465 (1913) Lantz v. Moeller 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac. 687 (1913) Johns
v. Cother 78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755 (1914) Chamberlain v. Percy, 8-2 Wash.
157, 143 Pac. 977 (1914) Ronald v. Schoenfeld, 94 Wash. 238, 162 Pac. 43
(1917) Hosner v. Conservative Co., 99 Wash. 161, 168 Pac. 1123 (1917)
Brehn v. Aetna Co., 110 Wash. 460, 188 Pac. 489 (1920).
'30 Pac. 741, 31 Pac. 95.
- Kegyes v. Sabin, 101 Wash. 618, 172 Pac. 8'35 (1918).
a'Strohl v. Seattle Bank, 25 Wash. 28, 35, 64 Pac. 916 (1901), so construed
the Thompson case.
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The Ohio Archetype.
As just seen, the argument was rested on the reasoning of the Ohio
court.25  In the cited Ohio case, Rouse v. Merchants Bank (18 8 9 )2"
it was held that after a corporation -has ceased to carry on business
oreferences cannot be made to cognitive creditors. The decision empha-
sizes the idea that the judicial principle of equality is effective to pre-
vent preferences from being made out of the assets of a business which
has ceased to function.27  Whether the rule applied to an insolvent
"The Supreme Court of Washington was guided largely by the case of
Rouse v. Merchants Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493." Gilbert, J., in Coler v. Allen, 114
Fed. 609, 61N (C. C. A. Wash.), (1902).
-6 46 Oh. St. 493, 92 N. E. 293, 5 L. R. A. 378, 15 Am. St. Rep. 6.14.
"It being established that the corporate property is a trust fund for the
benefit of the corporate creditors, it follows that, after the insolvency of the
corporation is ascertained and the objects of its creation are no longer pursued,
the managing board of directors then having the custody of the property
become trustees thereof for the creditors, and this relation necessarily forbids
any discrimination between the beneficiaries in the distribution or application
of the fund. The objects for which the corporation was created being no
longer prosecuted, and the occasion for the exercise by the board of directors
of the power of control and disposition of the property for such purpose having
ceased, there remains no purpose to which its assets can lawfully be devoted
except to the payment of the debts. When the fund is no longer demanded
for the purposes of the corporation, the rights of the creditors become fixed
instantly and equally, for each, having contributed to the common fund, has
an interest in it, in proportion to his claim, equally with every other creditor.
This interest is sometimes called the equitable lien of the creditor on tile cor-
porate property, which enables him to follow it, even after it has left the hands
of the directors, wherever it can be found, except in the possession of bona
fide purchasers for value, and subject it to the payment of the corporate
indebtedness. It would seem to result as a necessary consequence that insolvent
corporations which have ceased to carry on business, cannot, by pledge or
mortgage of the corporate property to some of the creditors in payment or
security of antecedent debts, without other consideration, create valid pref-
erences in their favor over others, and it is maintained by the more recent
writers on the subject that such preferences cannot be made.
"Mr. Morawetz, in his excellent work on private corporations, says: 'This
doctrine, in the opinion of the writer, is wholly indefensible on principle. The
capital provided for the security of the creditors of a corporation is a fund
held for the benefit of all the creditors equally. That the unsecured creditors
of a corporation are entitled to an equal distribution of the common security
has often been recognized by the courts of equity in adjusting the rights of
creditors among themselves, and in relation to the company's shareholders.
After a corporation has become insolvent and has ceased to carry on business,
the rights of its creditors become fixed. The purposes of a corporation
are not furthered in any manner by giving it or its agents the power, after
the company has become insolvent, and has ceased to carry on business, and
after its shareholders have lost their interests in the corporate estate, to prefer
a portion of the creditors, according to interest or mere whim, and to pay
their claims in full, leaving the others wholly without redress.
"Without extending the discussion, we are of the opinion that when a
corporation for profit, organized under the laws of this state, becomes insolvent
and ceases to carry on its business or further pursue the purposes of its crea-
tion, the corporate property constitutes a trust fund for the equal benefit of
the corporate creditors."
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corporation, continuing to prosecute its business, was expressly left open
in that decision, 2s to be definitely decided by the same judges the very
next year. Damartn v. Huron Co. (1890) .2  In the latter case the
insolvent corporation mortgaged all its real estate to its bankers (who
knew of its financial embarrassment) to secure preexisting debts. The
court upheld the mortgage because the company was not ceasing busi-
ness, but, on the contrary, was trying to work its way out.30
The last-mentioned Ohio decision was rendered nearly two years
prior to the first "trust-fund" case in Washington, which, as seen,
adopted the Ohio rule.
The Controlling Opinion in Washington.
Conover v. Hill (1895),31 furnished the occasion for the definitive
adherence to the doctrine under discussion.
In that case, the favorite creditors, having advanced notice of the
approaching end, started the usual scramble with writs of execution.
The receiver of the corporation, upon appointment, sought to unfasten
these legal clutches from the corpus of the assets.
Dunbar, C. J. (one of the leaders of the bench at that time), wrote
an elaborate argument in support of the "trust-fund" doctrine. He
pointed out that the statutes of the state provided for equity receivers
to wind up failed corporations. Such a legislative enactment, he argued,
evinces a partiality towards the doctrine of equality as opposed to the
2 "Whether an insolvent corporation which is still a going concern, and in
good faith engaged in the prosecution of its business, may borrow money, or
contract, or procure an extension of other bona fide indebtedness, and convey
or pledge the corporate property in security thereof, is a question not involved
in this case, and upon which we here express no opinion."
-47 Oh. St. 581, 26 N. E. 39.
10 "The petition in this case was filed on the day following the execution
and record of the mortgages to the banks; but, upon the principle of Rouse v.
Bank, 46 Oh. St. 493, 22 N. E. 293, there can be no question but that, if at the
time of the execution of these mortgages the intention were to procure the
institution of a suit on the next day for the dissolution of the corporation and
the appointment of a receiver, the execution of the mortgages and the com-
mencement of the suit should be regarded as one transaction, and to give
effect to the mortgages would, under such circumstances, amount to a plain
fraud on the law. The right of a company, though embarrassed, to con-
tinue its business and to retrieve its fortunes, if possible, must be conceded
to it as well as to natural persons, and this right necessarily carries with it
the power to obtain an extension of credit by giving a mortgage upon its prop-
erty to such of its creditors as are unwilling to give further time unless so
secured. When this power is fairly and honestly exercised, with no purpose
at the time of immediately abandoning business or making an assignment, the
validity of a security so obtained cannot well be questioned."
1 10 Wash. 673, 39 Pac. 166, 45 Am. St. Rep. 819.
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"race of energy." The judge quotes Morawetz's approval of the doctrine
of equality.32 Reliance on the Ohio decision is reiterated.
The "trust-fund" doctrine was now a fait accompli, in the state of
Washington.
The Net Result of the Original "Trust-Fund" Doctrine
A few of the courts, such as those in Ohio and Washington, con-
trived, as we have just seen, to conjure up a doctrine that would pre-
vent the rush of the nimble at the corporate remains. Simultaneously
with the approach of the dissolution of the corporation came the hand
of the court to stay the scramble. Just as a legislative bankruptcy sys-
tem operated to distribute equally the assets of a defunct debtor, and
in order to do so effectually, prohibited preferences made in view of
this finale; so the judicial bankruptcy doctrine under discussion dealt
with the final dissolution, and the preferences made in contemplation
thereof.
Such being the basis of the rule, it, of course, followed that corpora-
tions, though insolvent, which were struggling to survive (within rea-
son), were not affected by the doctrine. This was the express holding
of the court which furnished the inspiration for the doctrine in the
state of Washington. 3  And so also we find the contemporaneous
decisions of the Washington supreme court.3" "What was said", ex-
plained the court through one of the judges who had originally an-
nounced the doctrine, "was confined to corporations having practically
stopped business, or reached a point where the corporate business could
no longer be successfully prosecuted." 33  And so in most of the cases
I Which, we note, is confined to a corporation that "has become insolvent
and has ceased to carry on business." P. 679 of 10 Wash.
- (a) See Fifth Bank v. Johnson, -19 Fed. 89 (C. C. A. Ohio), (1915)
"These cases admonish that Rose v. Bank must not lead us beyond the real
point there decided, which seems to be that the trust which makes it a con-
structive fraud to prefer one creditor over another arises when a corporation
has abandoned the objects of its organization, yielded up dominion of its prop-
erty to its creditors for administration and ceased to be a going concern. This
interpretation and this limitation are confirmed by Damarin Co. v. Huron Co.,
47 Oh. St. 581, 590, !6 N. B. 37, and were adopted by this court in Haines v.
Bank, 203 Fed. 225, 212 C. C. A. 431." (b) See, also, Mfanton V. Seiberling
Co., 107 Ia. 534, 78 N. W 194, 5 (1899).
(a) Leslie v. Wilshire, 6 Wash. 282, 33 Pac. 505 (1893) (b) Vincent v.
Sioqualmite Mdll Co., 7 Wash. 566, 35 Pac. 396 (1894) (c) Holbrook v.
Peters Co., 8 Wash. 344, 36 Pac. 256 (1894) (d) Brooks v. Skookumn Mfg. Co.,
9 Wash. 80, 37 Pac. 284 (1894).
'Brooks v. Skookum Mfg. Co., 9 Wash. 80, 84, 37 Pac. 284 (1894).
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in which the doctrine was applied, we find that the avoided preferences
had been made in contemplation of approaching dissolution3'
We have most cogent evidence that this was also the understanding
of the bar of that time. In July of 1896, Judge Donworth, then Vice-
President of the State Bar Association, so sketched the scope of the
then freshly formed theory "
Such was also the appraisal of the doctrine at the end of its formative
period by the federal court on the ground. The rule is applicable,
observed the appellate court,"s only to preferences made in view of an
approaching dissolution and not to a going, though insolvent, concern.
(a.) Smith v. Hopkins, 10 Wash. 77, 38 Pac. 854 (1894) (b) Compton v.
Schwabacher 15 Wash. 306, 46 Pac. 338 (1896) (c) Biddle Co. v. Pt. Tomn-
send Co., 16 Wash. 681, 48 Pac. 407 (1897).
^' PRoc. WASH. BAR Assx., pp. 94, 98-9 (1896) "The cases holding that a
corporation which has reached a point where it is impossible to go forward
and a dissolution is at hand, can, by the act of its stockholders or trustees, by
mere caprice or favoritism, divide its property among favored creditors, includ-
ing in some cases, the directors themselves, is so opposed to common justice
that it is surprising that courts have given their countenance to it.
"The law of this state as laid down in Thompson v. Huron Lumber Co.,
4 Wash. 600, and Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, is the doctrine merely of
common equity From the principles there laid down, it follows that when a
corporation has reached a point where its debts are equal to or greater than
its property and it cannot pay, in the ordinary course, and its business is no
longer profitable, and its managing officers do not intend in good faith to con-
tinue the corporate business, any attempt on the part of the corporation to
prefer one creditor over another is unlawful and voidable at the suit of other
creditors in a proper proceeding.
"A mortgage or conveyance to one creditor will not be set aside merely
because the corporate liabilities exceed the assets if made in good faith with
the expectation, of continuing the prosecution of the enterprise, and not in
contemplation of a suspension of business or winding up of the corporation."
: Coler v. Allen, 114 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. Wash.), (1902) "The corporation
had not to any extent closed its business, nor is it alleged that it was emoar-
rassed further than that it was insolvent. Its business was not brought to a
close until several months later. It is not alleged that he had any knowl-
edge of the insolvency of the corporation or that the officers of the latter
intended to give him a preference or to hinder or delay the other creditors.
The corporation was a going concern. At the time of giving the mortgage and
receiving the advances it was apparently preparing for the annual run of
salmon, which might be expected to furnish it the means of discharging or
reducing its liabilities. The Supreme Court of Washington, in adopting the
doctrine of the decisions above noted, was guided largely by the case of Rou.se
v. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 22 N. E. 293, 5 L. R. A. 378, 15 Am. St. Rep. 644.
But the Supreme Court of Ohio in a later case (Damarin v. Iron Co., 47 Ohio
St. 581, 26 N. B. 37) held that a mortgage executed by a corporation to secure
a pre-existing debt is not necessarily invalid for the reason that the compan"
was known to be insolvent, where the company was at the time in the possession
of its property, and in the active prosecution of its business, and intended to
continue therein unless Prevented by other creditors, and the object of the
mortgage was not to prefer the creditor, but to obtain an extension of credit."
The General Rule in the "Trust-Fund" States.
The stimuli and the psychological reaction being the same, we should
expect most of the "trust-fund" courts of this period to arrive at the
same approximate result, forbidding preferences made during, or in
contemplation of, dissolution, and not affecting going concerns, al-
though insolvent. And so they did.39
The exact limits of the "trust-fund" doctrine were thus truly out-
lined by one of its ardent advocates, Judge Seymour Thompson, when
that well-known jurist wrote:
"The meaning of the doctrine is, not that such assets are,
in any strict or close sense, a trust fund for the creditors of
the corporation, while it is a going concern. It does not in
any sense disable the directors from dealing with the assets
of the corporation, in the ordinary course of its business, as
fully as an individual might under the same circumstances deal
with his assets. But its meaning is that, when the line of
insolvency is reached or approached, so that the directors can
not longer deal with the assets of the corporation in the ordi-
nary course of business, but must deal with them in the con-
templation of insolvency and suspension then the assets be-
come, in the hands of the directors, a trust fund for the credi-
tors of the corporation." 3"a2
Great Britain and Canada.
It is interesting to note that the same thread of thought ran through
the judiciary of that time in the other English-speaking countries of
Great Britain40 and Canada.41
THE LATER WASHINGTON CASES.
Little additional light is to be gathered from the later decisions. Of
course, the emergency was over soon after 1898, upon the resumption
of the federal statutory bankruptcy system, which abolished, in the
(a) Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 11 So. 350, 23 L. R. A. GI8, 42 Am.
St. Rep. 29 (1892) (b) Lyons Co. v. Perry Co., 86 Tex. 143, 14 S. W 16 (1893)(c) abt v. Columbia Co., 85 Ore. 15, 34 Pac. 69-2, 6 (1893), (d) Sutton Mfg.
Co. v. Hutchinson (C. C. A. Ind.), 63 Fed. 496, 501 (1894) (e) Tradesman
Co. v. Knoxville Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 3-2 S. W 1097, 99 (1895), (f) Sanford
Pork Co. v. Howe, 157 U. S. 312, 39 L. Ed. 713 (1895).
Oa27 Am. L. Rev. 846 (1893).
"°In re Patent File Co., L. R. 6 Ch. App. 83 (1870), Lord Justice Mellish:
"There is nothing to show that a winding up of the company was then con-
templated. On the contrary, the directors intended to go on and thought that
by raising money they could retrieve the affairs of the company."
"Long v. Hancock, 12 Can. S. R. 532 (1885).
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manner of statutes, the obnoxious "race of energy" as to individuals
and corporations alike.
In some cases, we find the court applying the rules of Congress side
by side with it own ;42 in others, the statutory rule ;43 while in still
others, lawyer-like efforts to take advantage of the letter of the lan-
guage in prior decisions have been encouraged.
44
In the main, however, the court has reached results harmonious with
the original purpose. Cases where the creditor knew or should have
known that the corporation had no reasonable chance to escape disso-
lution have been decided against the preferred creditor 45 as well as
those in which the creditor strips the corporation of all its assets and
himself attempts an extra-judicial distribution among creditors. 4  Ob-
versely, transactions with insolvent but going concerns, reasonably made
with a view to the continuance, rather than the dissolution, of business,
have been upheld. 4' The distinction was accurately sensed by Fullerton,
J., in Woods v. Metropolitan Bank,48 when he wrote of a previous
decision.
"We cannot think either of these cases is controlling here.
In our own case, the obligations paid were obligations in-
curred and paid by the debtor to the bank under an express
agreement while the debtor was a going concern, and while
insolvency if it existed in fact, was not known, and were
'E. g., Benner v. Scandinavian Am. Bank, 73 Wash. 488, 131 Pac. 1149
(1913).
"B. g., Lloyd v. Sichler 94 Wash. 611, 162 Pac. 979 (1917) McKay v.
Sperry Co., 95 Wash. 209, 163 Pac. 377 (1917) McKnight v. Shadbolt, 98
Wash. 665, 168 Pac. 473 (1917).
" B. g., Simpson v. Western Co., 97 Wash. 626, 167 Pac. 113 (1917).
'Potvin v. Denny Co., 26 Wash. 309, 66 Pac. 376 (1901) Washington
Liquor Co. v. Alladio Cafe, 28 Wash. 176, 78 Pac. 461 (190.2) Allen v. Baxter
42 Wash. 434, 85 Pac. 96 (1906) Bohling v. Hendron, 56 Wash. 687, 106 Pac.
205 (1910) M1tutual Inv. Co. v. Walton Co., 91 Wash. 298, 157 Pac. 682 (1916)
Jones v. Hoquzam Lumber Co., 98 Wash. 172, 167 Pac. 117 (1917) Louden-
back v. Bohlke, 123 Wash. 75, 211 Pac. 891 (1923) U S. Fidelity Co. v. Ryan,
124 Wash. 329, ;14 Pac. 433 (19-23).
" Williams v. Davidson, 104 Wash. 315, 176 Pac. 334 (1918) Lung v.
Washington Grocery Co., 126 Wash. 506, 218 Pac. 207 (1923).
Vancouver Bank v. Union Mills, 85 Wash. 114, 119, 147 Pac. 643 (1915)
Westland v. Post Land Co., 115 Wash. 329, 197 Pac. 44 (1921) Connor v.
First Bank, 113 Wash. 662, 194 Pac. 562 (1921) Roseburg v. Evans Co., 1-3
Wash. 93, 212 Pac. 141 (1923). (The opinion writer here reasons around diffi-
culties by saying that a going concern "slow in meeting its accounts" is not
"insolvent" within the rule.) Terhune v. Weise 132 Wash. 208, 931 Pac. 954
(1925).
" 126 Wash. 346, 218 Pac. 966 (1923), affirmed on rehearing, 33 Wash. Dec.
471, 234 Pac. 672 (1925). The decision itself, insofar as it deals with the
"trust-fund" doctrine, is supportable only on the theory that the creditor
should have known from the fact that it was receiving the entire net proceeds
of the corporate receipts, that this meant the end.
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made for the express purpose of enabling the creditor to con-
tinue its business."
The Variants from the Original Doctrine.
We have seen how the court was compelled, by its mental attitude
toward its own function, to seize upon a familiar symbol (the term
"trust-fund"), under cover of which name the desired principles of
equality might operate.
Unfortunately, however, a persistence in a white fiction like this,
after its purpose has been accomplished, is likely to create considerable
confusion.
This familiar danger inheres in the use of language. 9
The result is that the "concept is sometimes actually re-
duced to a word completely void of all intellectual content." The
symbol thus comes "to constitute a valuable point of attachment and
support for the corresponding emotion, which is so intense that it does
not perceive that the cherished resemblances no longer clothe the be-
loved object."50
This expected result really occurred with the "trust-fund" doctrine.
While it is probable that in most of the border-line cases,5 the actual
decision was in harmony with the doctrine as intended to be promul-
gated, in that the creditors receiving the preferences should, as reasona-
ble men, have known in the particular case that the corporation was
"hopelessly" insolvent,52 nevertheless the opinions were repetitions of
the bare formula. "That the assets of an insolvent corporation are a
trust fund and no creditor can secure a preference over others." This
formula obviously can be, and has been, taken to mean a great deal
more than was covered by the original doctrine that no creditor may
.deliberately receive more than his equal share of the assets of a cor-
,The symbol ("trust-fund"), the psychologists say, "substitutes a deter-
mined and invariable sign for an inexact, nebulous and therefore a continually
variable and fluctuating concept." (Rignano, PsycioaoGy or RzAsoxxo, p.
253 [1923J). "One of the fundamental functions of this sort of symbol," con-
tinues Rignano, "is that of furmslung a stable verbal support for inexact,
iebulous and fluctuating concepts to be recalled to the mind whenever required,
without prejudice to their elasticity.'
Rignano, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING, p. 955 (1923).
Oook v. Moody, 18 Wash. 114, 50 Pac. 620 (1897) Van Brockle v.
,Queen City Co., 19 Wash., 552, 43 Pac. 822 (1898), Carroll v. Pacific National
Bank, 19 Wash. 639, 54 Pac. 32 (1898), Burrell v. Bennett, -0 Wash. 644, 56
Pac. 375 (1899).
'See, for example, briefs of counsel in the Cook case, supra, No. 2743.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
poration which is either being actually dissolved or must reasonably
come to that end.
The only escape from this labyrinthine verbiage is to discard the
symbol. The facts must be faced without fiction. Indeed, the constant
cry of the critics of the "trust-fund" doctrine has been against the use
of the name.5" What many of them do not understand, however, is
that the symbol was necessary as a foot-hold under the prevailing phi-
losophy of the judicial function. Now that it has come to be recognized
(except in the backwoods) that "the (judicial) process in its highest
reaches is not discovery but creation, ' 54 and that "the law (of the
judges) is not found but made,"5 it is time that we abandon the
fiction, especially if, as here, it is misleading. 6
' 9 HARv. L. REV., 481 (1892) 2 ORE. L. REv., vim (1923).
" (a) Mr. Justice Cardozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 166, also p.
135 (1921). (b) As stated by Inch, J., in The trnderwriter, 3 Fed. (2d)
483, a (1925) "The right and sometimes duty of a court to legislate as to
'interstitial' matters is well set forth in Judge Cardozo's thoughtful book, 'TiE
NAT E OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. " (c) Hutcheson, J., in Belfast Marit, 6 Fed.
(2d) 89 90 (1925).
'Id., p. Ila, 116: "There is in truth nothing revolutionary or even novel
in this view of the judicial function. It is the way the courts have gone about
their business for centuries in the development of the common law."
" In Oppenhem. v. Kridel, 263 N. Y. 156, 140 N. E. 227 (1923), Crane, J.
(for the court: Cardozo, Pound, Hogan, J. J., and Hiscock, C. J., concurring),
applied the modern theory and refused to follow archaic common law decisions,
saying: "The common law is not rigid and inflexible, a thing dead to all sur-
rounding and changing conditions; it does expand with reason. The common
law is not a compendium of mechanical rules, written in fixed and indelible
characters, but a living organism which grows and moves in response to the
larger and fuller development of the nation." McLaughlin, J., was the sole
supporter of the old theory, protesting that the decision about to be made
"changes the law of the state in a manner which should be effected iy
legislation."
For further references to the present thought on the subject see: (a)
Albertsworth, S A. B. ji. Joia., pp. 673, 676 (192-2) "Another factor which
ia' emphasized the belief that in reality the nature of law is not absolute nor
final, has been the growth in recent times of a clearer understanding with
reference to the nature of the judicial process. It has been seen that this is
not merely a discovery of pre-existing law as set forth in the precedents or
practices of peoples, but that it is at the same time quite often creation of
law, according as the judge consciously applied the methods of analogy, logic
and sociology. This fact, that the judge actually legislates and more espe-
cially so where the statutory law is silent, has of necessity led to a perpetuation
of the conception that law cannot be final." (b) Wormser, 23 COL. L. REV. 701,
2 (1923). (c) Underhill Moore, 23 COL. L. REv. 614 (1923). (d) Roscoe
Pound, 10 A. B. A. Joua., pp. 549, 553 (1924). (e) Carpenter, 17 CoL. L. REV-
593 (1917). (f) Mr. Justice Holmes, THE Cosisto. LAw, p. 35 (1895).
(g) Ezra Thayer, 5 HARv. L. REv., p. 199 (1891). (h) Holland, JuIsPauD-
E-,CE (5th ed.), p. 56 (1890) "In point of fact the courts in all countries
have necessarily been entrusted with a certain power of making rules for cases
not provided for previously, and even of modifying existing laws from time to
time in order to carry out the current ideas of what is equitable or to adapt
them to the changing needs of society"
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The idea is expressed in Veblenese as follows:
"While modern men continue to boast and laud the change-
less antiquity and stability of the rules which govern their in-
dustrial relations, it is at the same time their pride and boast
that the industrial arts which condition their behavior under
these rules are forever changing, progressively and at an ever-
accelerating rate. In time, immutable rules of conduct en-
forced under progressively changing conditions should logi-
cally result in a muddle.
"There is, of course, nothing particularly new or peculiarly
civilized about this obstinate assumption that the main speci-
fications of the legal and moral code are ancient and immuta-
ble. Indeed, it is quite the usual thing among the common
run of barbarians and savages, ancient and contemporary. But
all the while, in point of fact and as a matter of course, any
system of law and custom, being a product of habituation, is
necessarily subject to continued change, even in respect of its
underlying principles. But always and everywhere
men like to believe that their own particular standards of
conduct are fixed in the nature of things, so that to each
people their own established scheme of usages, in law and
morals, is immutably right and good, in principle." (1923,
ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP, p. 15.)
The difficulties will disappear when we remember that the doctrine
was announced as a judicial bankruptcy measure to prevent an un-
equal distribution among creditors at the commercial death of a cor-
poration.
I think the method of approach, here advocated, for the solution of
questions in this field, will best be brought home by considering a con-
crete problem.
THE QUESTION OF "GOOD FAITH" OF THE PREFERRED CREDITOR.
We find the statement repeated in several of the recent opinions
of the Washington supreme court, that a preference may not be
given by an insolvent corporation, "no matter what the good faith of
the creditor is"5 and which in Woods v. Metropolitan Bank58 threatens
to be erected into a rule that "it is not necessary that the creditor, at
"' Holcomb, J., in Jones v. Hoquiam Co., 98 Wash. 17, 185, 167 Pac. 117
(1917), repeated in Williams v. Davidson, 104 Wash. 315, 321, 176 Pac. 334(1918).
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the time of receiving the preference, had knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe that the corporation was insolvent."
Of course, the creditor may be in actual good faith and still not be
protected, where, for example, he takes over the entire assets of the
corporation and attempts to distribute them extra-judicially9 or where
he, as a reasonably prudent business man, should have known that the
corporation was hopelessly insolvent. 0
There remains, however, the residual question as to whether or not
a creditor, who has innocently obtained payment or security from a
concern about to expire, must restore. This is an item of judicial
legislation which may be ruled either way The point made here is:
The solution should not be sought by the mechanical application of
any symbol, such as "trust-fund." A frank inquiry into policy should
be the basis for decision. Thus will be seen by the following actual
comparison of these methods.
From a Sociological Standpoint.
Favorable to the view that the innocent creditor should be made to
restore is the fact that the innocence of the creditor has no logical
bearing on the result actually accomplished. A violation of the ab-
stractly just general rule of equal division among creditors occurs
whether or not the creditor is innocent that he is being preferred. In
short, the objectionable unequal division results irrespective of the
creditor's good faith.
Against this is the powerful plea of business necessity As the fed-
eral supreme court has so forcibly put it: "Hundreds of men con-
stantly continue to make payments up to the very eve of their failure,
which it would be very unjust and disastrous to set aside.
The debtor is often buoyed up with the hopes of being able to get
through with his difficulties long after his case is in fact desperate,
and his creditors, if they know anything of his embarrassments, either
participate in the same feeling, or at least are willing to think that
there is a possibility of his succeeding. To overhaul and set aside all
*1126 Wash. 346, 0-18 Pac. 266 (19-3), affirmed on re-hearing 33 Wash. Dec.
471, 231 Pac. 954 (1905).
"As in Tacoma Ledger Co. v. Western Assn., 37 Wash. 467 79 Pac. 992
(1905), and Williams v. Davidson, 104 Wash. 315, 176 Pac. 334 (1918).
'Jones v. Hoquiam Lu'mber Co., 98 Wash. 172, 176 Pac. 117 (1917)
Woods v. Metropolitan Bank, 126 Wash. 346, 218 Pac. 966 (1923), and 33
Wash. Dec. 471, 231 Pac. 954 (19,25).
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his transactions with his creditors, made under such circumstances,
because there may exist some grounds of suspicion of his inability to
carry himself through, would make the bankrupt law an engine of
oppression and injustice. It would, in fact, have the effect of produci
ing bankruptcy in many cases where it might otherwise be avoided.
"Hence the act, very wisely, as we think, instead of making a pay-
ment or a security void for a mere suspicion of the debtor's insolvency,
requires, for that purpose, that his creditor should have some reasonable
cause to believe him insolvent. He must have a knowledge of some
fact or facts calculated to produce such a belief in the mind of an
ordinarily intelligent man." 6'
The same court had previously declared,6 2 "No one would know
with whom he could safely deal, and besides, a person in this condition
would have no encouragement to make proper efforts to extricate him-
self from difficulty. It is for the interest of the community that every-
one should continue his business and avoid, if possible, going into bank-
ruptcy'.
"If it shall turn out that it (the transfer) was made in
good faith, for the honest purpose of discharging his indebtedness, and
in the confident expectation that by so doing he could continue his
business, it will be upheld."
Congress thus found the weightier argument on the side of the inno-
cent creditor who receives payment or security for his debt without
reasonable ground to believe that he is thereby receiving a preference. 63
Certain it is that these contending arguments have not yet been ex-
pressly weighed by the Washington supreme court. The unique propo-
sition cannot, therefore, be said to be established in this jurisdiction,
that the "trust-fund" doctrine will operate against a creditor who has
no reasonable cause to believe that the debtor corporation was, at the
time, hopelessly insolvent.
So much for the sociological side of the subject.
"Grant v. National Bank, 97 U. S. 80, 24 L. Ed. 971 (1878), quoted with
approval by Main, J., in Dunlap v. Seattle National Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 592-3,
161 Pac. 364 (1916).
c Tiffany v. Lucas, 15 Wall. 410, 21 L. Ed. 198 (1873).
13That is to say, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was hopelessly
insolvent, in which event, of course, the creditor would be deliberately receiv-
ing an unequal proportion of the debtor's assets. 4 REzr. ow B~xxnMuTcy (3d
ed), §§ 1819, 1827 (1923). See Stratton v. Lawson, 27 Wash. 310, 67 Pac. 562
(1902).
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For the Logical Mind.
Let us now deal with the subject as would a logician,6 4 merely,
and ignore the sociologist. We will travel the path a short way only
before we become aware of the futility of trying to find a solution by
strictly logical methods based upon a verbal fiction ("trust-fund")
The situation which would confront us, as logicians, is one in which
bona fide persons are dealing with a corporation having full legal title
to the property involved. The "trust-fund" doctrine creates, let us
say, an equitable trust interest in such property in favor of the creditors
of the insolvent owning corporation. This equity is secret, so far as
the person dealing with the corporation is concerned.
Now, reverting to the symbol, "trust-fund", we, as good logicians,
would ascertain the rules governing trust property and bona fide pur-
chasers thereof.
According to the well settled rule in equity in this kind of case,
bona fide purchasers of the trust property for value and without notice
are protected. 65 So the task would be that of matching the cases to
ascertain who are bona fide purchasers for value without notice. "Pur-
chasers for value" would, then, be the key words for this logical inquiry.
1. A creditor who takes property in part payment of a pre-existing
debt is a purchaser for value.66
2. If the property is taken by the creditor not as part payment but
as security, then he is not a purchaser for value, 67 unless the creditor
"See the classification of types of legal reasoning (sociological, historical,
logical, etc.) in Cardozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, pp. 51, 98, 102 and
112 (1921).
"(a) This is conceded as of course in the leading "trust-fund" case of
Rou'se v. Merchants Bank, 26 Oh. St. 493, 22 N. E. 2-93 (1893)-see excerpt from
this case in Note 27, supra. (b) As stated in 26 R. C. L. 1296: "In some
instances, property, whether real or personal, is held in trust without the instru-
ment vesting title in the trustee, indicating that it is so held. When such is the
case, the trustee, while dealing with persons who have no notice of the trust,
has the same power as if he were the holder of the equitable as well as of the
legal title. In other words, a purchaser from him in good faith and without
notice of the trust obtains the title of the trustee, and holds it discharged of
the trust, and tree from all obligations to account to the beneficiary"
"Long v. McAvoy, 33 Wash. Dec. 310, 233 Pac. 930 (1925).
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has changed his position by extending the maturity of the debt, releasing
other security, or otherwise."'
3. Negotiable paper (although secured by mortgage) taken for a
pre-existing debt is a purchase for value, this being an exception to the
preceding rule.09
I have tabulated the deductions of strict logic resulting from the
symbol "trust-fund", to emphasize the clear thinking of Pomeroy when
he criticized the use of the logical method in this field.
"Some legal rules" he wrote, in this connection, "ought to be settled
in accordance with the results of experience and the dictates of policy,
rather than by a compliance with the deductions of a strict logic."1
70
We see at once the irrationality of a creditor's being cleared under
some of these rules and mulcted under the others.
Yet the courts of this jurisdiction so far seem to pursue, outwardly,
at least, the logical method in handling the problems in this field. On
the contrary, the dictates of policy and the results of experience (the
sociological method outlined above) should, it is submitted, be openly
considered as the basis for determining whether an innocent creditor
be compelled to restore what has been given him on his debt. The
method of logic just sketched, based, .as it is, on an illusory symbol,
leads merely to an elaboration of rules, sub-rules and exceptions wholly
devoid of real relation to the judicious solution of the problems
involved.71
SUMMARY.
The "trust-fund" doctrine-a bankruptcy system for corporations-
was a real contribution of judicial legislation to an emergent situation.
But the symbol, through which the principle of equality among credi-
tors was engrafted onto this particular part of the law, has unfortu-
"McDonald v. Johns, 62 Wash. 5-1, 114 Pac. 175, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57
(1911), and Malin v. Grziflth, 109 Wash. 30, 34, 186 Pac. 647 (1919).
cs 19 R. C. L. 409-10, and 27 Cyc. 1191-0.
cAmerican Bank v. Helgeson, 64 Wash. 54, 60, 116 Pac. 837 (1911).
2 PoM. EQ. (4th) p. 1534.
"The practical injustice of applying the logical method in the "trust-fund"
field is powerfully presented in the presidential address of Judge Chadwick, 20
June 1924, PRoc. WASH. STATE BAn Assx., pp. 58-61.
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nately survived to obscure the real scope of the doctrine, which is to
prevent the race of energy among creditors of a moribund corporation.
The rule would seem to be inapplicable where the debtor, although at
the moment "insolvent," is struggling (within reason) to continue, or
the creditor is merely liquidating his debt without reasonable cause to
believe that the corporation is in articulo.
In any event, the solution is not logical but sociological.
Hyman Zettler
SEATTLE, AVASHIEGTO-N.
